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Introduction 
It is now just over a decade since the beginning of the financial crisis 
that started with the failure of UK bank Northern Rock and which went 
on to beset much of the globe.  The last ten years have seen an 
enormous amount of international effort directed at identifying 
policies that will prevent a similar crisis from occurring in the future 
and in enacting legislation that will achieve this goal and, ultimately, 
protect the taxpayer from bearing the costs of cross-border bank 
failure1 that result from the problem of “too big to fail”.2  Within the 
UK, one of these policies has been to introduce ring-fencing 
                                                 
* The authors are grateful for the comments and insights of fellow academics on this topic shared at 
the INSOL Europe Academic Forum in Berlin on 30 September 2015. 
 
1 Within the UK and the EU these have included the UK’s 2008 Banking (Special Provisions) Act 
(emergency legislation to introduce an insolvency regime for Northern Rock) and 2009 Banking Act (a 
new insolvency regime for failing banks); the EU’s 2009/14/EC Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive 
[2009] OJ L68/3 (which increased the depositor protection limit across the EU); the UK’s 2012 Financial 
Services Act (which replaced the Financial Services Authority as regulator with the Prudential Regulation 
Authority (the Bank of England) and the Financial Conduct Authority); the EU’s 2013 CRD IV 
(EU/575/2013 Capital Requirements Regulation [2013] OJ L176/1 and 2013/36/EU Capital 
Requirements Directive [2013] OJ L176/388) (which introduced Basel III to improve prudential 
requirements for banks); the UK’s 2013 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act (to introduce ring-
fencing); as well as the EU’s 2014/59/EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive [2014] OJ 2 173/190 
(the “BRRD” which seeks to standardise the EU approach to bank resolution, introducing pre-agreed 
plans, crisis management groups and bail in), EU/806/2014 Single Resolution Mechanism [2014] OJ 2 
225/1 (the “SRM” which provides a centralised approach to cross-border bank failure within the 
Eurozone) and the 2014/49/EU Recast Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive [2014] OJ 2 173/149 (the 
“DGSD”).  The US saw the enactment of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act Pub L No 11-203, tit II, 124 Stat 1326 (2010) (the “Dodd-Frank Act”). 
2 (“TBTF”) whereby a global systemically important bank or financial institution (“G-SIB” or “G-SIFI”) 
has to be supported with government funds because its failure would cause contagion of the financial 
system as a whole and so trigger the failure of other banks and financial institutions with serious 
consequences for the global economy. 
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(otherwise known as structural separation) for deposit-taking banks.3  
This is, essentially, the separation of retail banking from wholesale 
and investment banking within an otherwise “universal” bank with 
the aim of reducing the risks to which the retail banking arm is 
exposed.   
 
Yet this measure has not been adopted universally.  It has been 
considered in detail but not adopted by the EU4 and it has been 
actively rejected in Australia.5  In the US, a form of ring-fencing was 
introduced in the Dodd-Frank Act through the Volcker Rule,6 but this 
is now being affected by the political situation as President Trump has 
stated that he wants to repeal the Dodd-Frank Act.7  Thus it may be 
the case that the position in the US becomes quite different.   
 
As the UK arrangements for ring-fencing went “live” in 2018 ahead 
of their formal introduction in January 2019, it makes sense critically 
                                                 
3 Through the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 (“FSBRA 2013”) which amends the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 to incorporate the ring-fencing provisions. 
4 Ring-fencing was extensively discussed in the Liikanen Report: Erkki Liikanen Final Report of the High-
level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector Brussels, October (2012).  This 
led to an EU proposal for structural separation: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions Brussels, 
29.1.2014 COM (2014) 43 final 2014/0020 (COD).  The Proposal was rejected by the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs on 26 May 2015 ECON_PV (2015) 0527_1 available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu (accessed 6 September 2015).  On 19 June 2015 the European Council 
agreed its position but is waiting for the EU Parliament to respond.  See Press Release 474/15 available 
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/19-restructuring-risky-banks-
council-agrees-negotiating-stances accessed 4 January 2018.  
5 The Australian Financial Systems Inquiry concluded that other prudential improvements, such as 
increasing capital requirements, would make ring-fencing unnecessary and that the focus of Australia’s 
financial system should be on aligning itself with best international practice. See the Australian 
Government (The Treasury) Financial Systems Inquiry Themes of Report: Resilience. Available at: 
http://fsi.gov.au/publications/final-report/overview/themes-of-this-report (accessed 3 January 2018). 
This approach was subsequently affirmed by the Australian Government in its Response of the Australian 
Government to the Financial Systems Inquiry 19 October 2015.  Available at: 
https://treasury.gov.au/publication/government-response-to-the-financial-system-inquiry/resilience-
measures (accessed 3 January 2018).   
6 §619 Dodd-Frank Act (US) (n 1). 
7 See, for example, CNN ‘President Trump is taking steps to keep his word to “do a big number” on the 
2010 Dodd-Frank financial reform law’ <http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/21/news/trump-executive-
order-taxes/index.html> (accessed 4 January 2018), Donald J Trump Presidential Executive Order on 
Core Principles for Regulating the US Financial System 3 February 2017 and Tom Young ‘Trump's 
proposed Dodd-Frank rollback unpicked’ International Financial Law Review, 02626969, 3/6/2017. 
3 
 
to reflect upon what, if anything, this measure adds to the totality of 
the reforms to the financial sector safety net that have evolved in 
response to the crisis and consider whether it can be considered a 
necessary and/or useful initiative.  The impact of this paper will be 
derived first, from its role in contributing to the ongoing global debate 
on this topic;8 second, from its contribution to the wider EU discussion 
of the adequacy of existing EU financial stability measures, including 
its depositor protection arrangements; and third, from its analysis of 
the specific question as to whether UK-style ring-fencing should be 
introduced by the EU to enhance the current EU depositor protection 
framework that is in place. 
 
The first part of this paper will introduce the authors’ central thesis, 
namely, that ring-fencing has a role to play in enhancing depositor 
protection where depositors do not trust governments to honour their 
deposit guarantee schemes, but that beyond this, it may serve to add 
little of real value to financial stability.  The paper will then put this 
into context, with part two considering the definition of ring-fencing 
as a financial regulatory concept, as posited by Schwarcz,9 before 
analysing the form of ring-fencing that is being considered in this 
paper and the particular problem that it seeks to resolve in part three.  
Part four will critically consider the UK model of ring-fencing, with 
part five exploring the US approach by way of contrast.  The final part 
of the paper will critically reflect upon how ring-fencing fits into the 
reformed financial regulatory framework and analyse the utility of the 
UK’s approach as a model for other jurisdictions. 
                                                 
8 Financial Stability Board ‘Structural Banking Reforms: Cross-border consistencies and global financial 
stability implications. Report to G20 Leaders for the November 2014 Summit’ 27 October (2014).  The 
importance of monitoring the implementation of structural reform as it is implemented was noted at p2.  
9 Steven L. Schwarcz ‘Ring-Fencing’ (2014) 87 Southern California Law Review 69. 
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It must be noted that, at the time of writing, the UK is in the process 
of withdrawing from the EU (“Brexit”) and its future relationship with 
the EU is far from certain.  The UK’s formal recovery and resolution 
mechanism for failing banks and financial institutions is currently 
aligned to the resolution mechanisms that exist in the rest of the 
EU,10 as are its deposit guarantee arrangements which are overseen 
by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (“FSCS”).11  It is not 
clear how far this alignment will continue into the future and this will 
be taken into consideration, where relevant, in the paper.  The 
discussion below begins by providing some context for the arguments 
put forward. 
 
Part one: Discussion 
The extent to which the measures that have been put in place over 
the last decade will truly protect the financial system from shocks 
cannot be known until a new international, financial crisis emerges, 
but in November 2014, Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England 
and Chair of the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) went as far as to 
state that “Globally systemic banks that fail will in future be resolved 
without recourse to the taxpayer and without jeopardising financial 
stability”.12  In his view, the banking system was safer, simpler and 
fairer, than at the time of the international financial crisis which began 
in 2007.  Safer, because previously undercapitalised banks were now 
                                                 
10 In the UK through the Banking Act 2009 which implements the BRRD and SRM (n 1). 
11 DGSD 2009/14/EC (n 1) harmonised the amount of depositor protection across Member States at 
€100,000 (£85,000).  This figure has now been confirmed in the Recast DGSD 2014/49/EU which also 
standardises repayment deadlines to 7 days and excludes protected deposits from bail in under the 
BRRD (n.1). Post-Brexit, the UK will no longer be bound by the Recast DGSD and will be able to decide 
on what level of cover to provide. 
12 Mark Carney, “The future of financial reform”, 17 November 2014. Available at 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications (accessed 17 June 2015). 
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largely recapitalised; simpler, because standards of disclosure had 
been improved so that balance sheets provided a better reflection of 
contingent claims that had too frequently previously been hidden in 
complex finance chains; and fairer, with the introduction of “total loss 
absorbing capacity” (also known as “bail in”)13 for globally systemic 
banks to ensure that the taxpayer would not be called upon for bail 
outs.   
 
Governor Carney’s optimism was put to the test shortly after this 
statement was made; within two years of his remarks, a banking 
crisis in Italy led to government intervention using public funds in 
December 2016. The events in Italy demonstrated that the idea that 
the days of using taxpayer funds for the bailout of a financially 
distressed bank are not actually over, with a capital injection of at 
least €5 million being given by the Italian government to Italy’s third-
largest and oldest bank, Bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena, to prevent 
it from failing.  Nevertheless, it is entirely reasonable to agree that, 
in general, banking systems (as a distinct element of the financial 
system as a whole) are in a better state than in 2007-814 and this has 
been demonstrated by the results of stress testing.15 
                                                 
13 Whereby banks must first have recourse to certain types of subordinated debt and shareholder funds 
before approaching governments for public money. 
14 As Sir John Vickers pointed out in his response to the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee on 
30 June 2015, Mr Carney referred to “Globally” (our italics) systemically important institutions; the 
possibility remains that national systemically important financial institutions could still cause problems.  
(See video recording of session available at: Parliamentlivetv 
http://parliamentlive.tv/event/index/2019e0ca-4235-4853-8c17-af30b00f3ee3?in=15:36:33 at 
approximately 16.28.  Accessed 3 January 2018). 
15 The 2017 Bank of England stress testing results illustrated that, based on a scenario worse than that 
of the financial crisis, the banks tested could absorb £50 billion losses in the first two years of the stress 
and that no bank needed to strengthen its capital base.  The report is available at: 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/stress-testing/2017/stress-testing-the-uk-banking-system-2017-
results (accessed 3 January 2018).  The 2016 EU-Wide Stress Test Results published by the European 
Banking Authority on 29 July 2016 stated that the results demonstrated “resilience in the EU banking 
sector as a whole thanks to additional capital raising” but also that the “results for individual banks vary 
significantly” at p7. The results are available at: 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1532819/2016-EU-wide-stress-test-Results.pdf 
(accessed 3 January 2018). 
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If all this has been achieved prior to the introduction of ring-fencing 
within the UK and in the absence of ring-fencing across the EU, it 
begs the question as to what possible additional benefits to financial 
stability ring-fencing brings to the table.  This question is important, 
as there are a number of significant disadvantages associated with 
ring-fencing, including the high cost of its introduction, the issues it 
raises as to regulatory arbitrage and the risks it poses in preventing 
the free flow of capital across jurisdictions (both within and without a 
situation of financial crisis).16   
 
It is the authors’ contention that the Italian crisis has demonstrated 
that ring-fencing could have a role in supplementing the existing, 
(and as will be discussed, often inadequate) depositor protection 
arrangements that exist across the EU.  Depositor protection is one 
of the components of the financial sector safety net, along with 
prudential regulation, lender of last resort facilities and a clearly 
defined mechanism for bank recovery and resolution.  Depositor 
protection is thus key to maintaining financial stability and preventing 
contagion.   
 
The rationale for the authors’ thesis is as follows.  Despite all EU 
Member States having to comply with the Recast DGSD17 and provide 
minimum protection of 100,000 euros to each depositor, it appears 
from events in Cyprus,18 Greece19 and more recently in Italy, that 
many depositors simply do not trust in their governments to actually 
                                                 
 
16 Issues identified in the FSB Report ‘Structural Banking Reforms’ (n 8) 1, 2. 
17 Recast DGSD 2014/49/EU (n 1). 
18 See, for example, Campbell, A. and Moffatt, P. Protecting Bank Depositors After Cyprus (2013) 1 
NIBLeJ 4. 
19 See for example, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-33303540 (accessed 4 January 2018). 
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be able to provide the protection being “guaranteed”.  This is hardly 
surprising as many European deposit guarantee schemes are not 
currently sufficiently funded to deal with a significant banking crisis 
and this will inevitably have an effect on public confidence.20  This 
apparent lack of trust has most recently been seen in Italy where, 
according to the Financial Times, depositors at Banc Monte dei Paschi, 
on becoming aware of its financial problems, steadily withdrew funds 
throughout 2016 with withdrawals increasing during December 2016 
as the crisis escalated.21   
 
The fact that withdrawals by depositors in Italy continued in spite of 
the existence of the government deposit guarantee indicates that 
depositors do not believe themselves to be adequately protected from 
bank failure.  This suggests that an additional layer of protection for 
deposits is necessary to provide depositors with confidence in the 
financial system.  The necessary protection could be found through 
the introduction of some form of ring-fencing.   
 
Whether ring-fencing should be adopted as a policy initiative to 
address this trust deficit, either within Italy or across the EU is, 
however, a matter of debate.  It is clear from the latest European 
Banking Authority (“EBA”) data that the level of ex ante funding of 
depositor protection schemes within the EU is insufficient for the level 
of protection that depositors would need should a financial crisis 
                                                 
20 The latest data published by the European Banking Authority is for December 2016.  See the Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes Data available at: https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/recovery-
and-resolution/deposit-guarantee-schemes-data (accessed 4 January 2018).  For example, Italy’s 
target for ex ante funding is 0.8% of covered deposits by 2024 to be held across both its schemes.  In 
December 2016, its banks held covered deposits of approximately €668bn which required funding of 
€5.3 billion, whereas the actual funding at that date was €621 million: a shortfall of approximately €4.7 
billion. 
21 Financial Times, 24 December 2016. 
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arise.22  This leads to a risk that government (that is, taxpayers) 
money would have to bridge any gap in shoring up depositors. 
Nevertheless, it is the authors’ view that it is not necessary for the 
EU to introduce the UK model of ring-fencing for the reasons that will 
be discussed below.  Before this discussion can take place, the 
conceptual basis for and definition of ring-fencing must first be 
considered.  
 
Part Two: Defining ring-fencing 
Schwarcz observes that the term “ring-fencing” is used in a number 
of different contexts and that it is a term that is often both poorly and 
inconsistently defined.23  His analysis (correctly, in the authors’ 
opinion) recognises the necessity of defining this term carefully, in 
view of the importance of its application as a regulatory tool and its 
consequent real-world economic impact.  He therefore defines the 
term from a functional perspective,24 concluding that ring-fencing is 
a financial regulatory concept concerned with “legally deconstructing 
a firm in order to more optimally reallocate and reduce risk”.25   
 
Schwarcz’s analysis provides a useful conceptual framework for 
understanding the UK model of ring-fencing as it is based on an 
understanding of four distinct situations in which ring-fencing is used 
in real-world cases.  The first situation is where it is necessary to 
make an entity bankruptcy remote and so improve its 
                                                 
22 EBA Deposit Guarantee Schemes Data  (n 17). 
23 Schwarcz (n 8) 72. 
24 Schwarcz (n 8) 73. 
25 Steven L. Schwarcz ‘Ring-Fencing’ (2014) 87 Southern California Law Review 69, 72.  The term is 
apparently little discussed academically.  Charles Kerrigan did not, in fact, define the term in his article 
‘News from dictionary corner: a definition of the word ring-fence’ (2013) 3 JIBFL 168 but instead set 
out a series of questions that may be asked to determine whether a ring-fence has been established. 
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creditworthiness (examples being securitisation models and the 
structure of utility companies).  The second is to help a firm to 
operate on a standalone basis, so that the failure of entities close to 
it does not trigger its own collapse.  The third situation is where ring-
fencing is necessary to preserve an entity’s business and assets, for 
example, during the process of an acquisition, by ensuring that all 
interaction between the acquirer and the target takes place on an 
arm’s length basis.  The final use of ring-fencing is as a means of 
limiting a firm’s risky activities and investments.  This latter use is 
clearly relevant in the banking context, as are the second and third 
uses of ring-fencing to the extent that they relate to the protection of 
essential bank services and provide for the smooth resolution of a 
failing bank.  Schwarcz sees ring-fencing as a subset of economic 
regulation.  This is pertinent to the discussion that follows because, 
as he identifies, the function of economic regulation is to prevent 
market failure within the financial system and this includes the 
reduction of systemic risk.26 
 
Although the two are linked, ring-fencing by means of the structural 
separation of bank functions must be distinguished from the form of 
bank ring-fencing discussed by D’Hulster and Ötker-Robe and 
described by them as “geographical” ring-fencing.27  This latter form 
of ring-fencing is used by banking groups operating across borders to 
ensure that certain parts of the bank will remain self-sufficient even 
if other parts of the group fail.   Self-sufficiency may be achieved in 
a number of ways, but it generally involves the imposition of higher 
than usual capital or liquidity requirements for certain parts of the 
                                                 
26 Schwarcz (n 8) 84. 
27 Katia D’Hulster and Inci Ötker-Robe ‘Ring-fencing cross-border banks: An effective supervisory 
response?’[2015] 16 (3) Journal of Banking Regulation 169. 
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group or the restriction of the payment of dividends or on liquidity 
flows.  As the authors note, this form of ring-fencing is generally 
viewed negatively as it is, essentially, a territorial approach to a 
cross-border problem and one which will be discussed further in this 
paper.  Before this discussion can take place, it is necessary first to 
explain the sense in which the term ring-fencing is being used for the 
purposes of this paper and why it might be considered a useful 
regulatory tool in this context.  
 
Part Three: The form of ring-fencing and the problems that it 
seeks to resolve 
In this paper, the form of ring-fencing that is being considered is the 
structural separation of retail banking, that is banking which involves 
consumers and small businesses, from wholesale and investment 
banking within an otherwise “universal” bank with the aim of reducing 
the risks to which the retail banking arm is exposed.  As explained by  
James Proudman from the PRA: 
 
“Ring-fencing addresses the problem that arises from universal 
banks that allow investment and international banking activities 
to be placed on the same balance sheet as the critical functions 
of lending, deposit-taking and payment services for retail and 
small corporate customers. This increases the risks to the 
provision of those critical functions, and potentially puts tax 
payers on the hook to save the whole bank, if things go wrong 
in the investment bank or the global economy.”28    
 
                                                 
28 James Proudman, Executive Director UK Deposit Takers Supervision, PRA, Bank of England in his 
speech ‘Putting up a fence” delivered at the British Bankers Association, 16 June 2017, 3. 
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In order to understand why ring-fencing is being implemented in the 
UK, the circumstances that have led to it must also be understood.  
Before the financial crisis of 2007, the model of the universal bank 
was, arguably, the paradigm as it was considered to be the most 
efficient way to provide banking services.29  Universal banking was 
considered advantageous because it not only enabled banks to offer 
all their business lines under one roof, but it also enabled them to 
maximise the efficient use of their capital.  Clients benefited from 
having ease of access to both retail and investment banking services 
through the same entity, whilst banks benefited because the capital 
(and now liquidity) requirements imposed under the Basel regime30 
were based upon the risks posed by the consolidated banking group, 
as opposed to those posed by the different branches of work that 
each part of the bank undertook.  The model also enabled the 
diversification of risk across a number of business lines so reducing 
costs of funding and the large scale of the operation meant that the 
business could benefit from the economies this provided through the 
centralisation of support services, such as human resources and 
information technology (“IT”).   
 
Whether these efficiency advantages were actually borne out in 
reality is a moot point: a literature review on determinants of 
different business models conducted by Gambacorta and van Rixtel 
suggests that the evidence for economies of scope and scale in large 
banks is mixed, and may even have assisted in benefiting banks by 
                                                 
29Leonardo Gambacorta and Adrian van Rixtel ‘Structural bank regulation initiatives: approaches and 
implications’ (2013) BIS Working Papers No.412, 1; Bank for International Settlements 83rd Annual 
Report Chapter V ‘The road to a more resilient banking sector’ (2013) 57 (both available at 
www.bis.org); and the Vickers Report (n 8) (all accessed 23 June 2015). 
30 Now enacted in the EU through CRD IV (the CRR and CRD) (n 1).  
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enabling them to achieve TBTF status.31  Nonetheless, the 
management of retail banking functions alongside investment 
banking functions through a universal banking structure was largely 
uncontroversial until 2008. 
 
It is also the case that, although the concept of the universal bank 
has been in existence for several decades, there has been a gradual 
change in the focus of the kinds of activities undertaken by these 
banks.  Banks have always pursued their core, commercial functions 
of taking deposits and making loans but, over time, wholesale 
banking and certain investment banking activities have grown in 
importance.  Securitisation became more widely used in the UK 
during the 1990s as a model for enabling banks to remove particular 
risks from their balance sheets and place them in special purpose 
vehicles.32  During the same period, banks also become more 
involved in the securities markets and a few extremely powerful G-
SIBs emerged.33  Understanding the role of the G-SIBs in investment 
banking activities is critical to this discussion, since it was their 
connection to the shadow banking sector which caused them to 
become unstable during the financial crisis.34  It is beyond the scope 
of this article to consider shadow banking in any detail other than to 
note that shadow banking institutions were not subject to the same 
degree of regulatory scrutiny as banks, nor were they subject to the 
                                                 
31 Gambacorta and van Rixtel (n 15) 8. 
32 Lord Turner ‘Turner Review’ (2009) 15.  Securitisation was already widely used in the US.  Northern 
Rock, Bradford & Bingley, Alliance and Leicester and HBOS all grew significantly at this time, relying on 
wholesale (interbank) funding and programmes of continuous securitisation to do so. See Turner Review 
35, available at <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf> (accessed 5 January 2018). 
33 Liikanen Report (n 10) 13; Turner Review (n 32) 36. 
34 Shadow banking is defined by the FSB as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities (fully 
or partly) outside the regular banking system” in the Financial Stability Board Report to G20 Leaders 
Overview of Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial 
Stability 14 November (2014) 17. 
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same prudential requirements, which enabled problems in that sector 
to seep into the mainstream banking sector.35 
The UK’s largest banks at the time of the financial crisis were 
Barclays, HSBC, HBOS, Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”).  
All were then considered systemically important, but only Barclays, 
and HSBC now appear on the FSB’s current list of G-SIBs.36  Barclays, 
and HSBC survived the financial crisis without UK government 
financial support, but the others did not.  RBS and HBOS failed for 
different reasons, but both failed because they had placed over-
reliance on their non-core banking activities. HBOS failed because it 
relied on wholesale funding, much of which was short term, and so 
suffered from a lack of liquidity.  RBS failed because it had acquired 
the Dutch bank ABN Amro at a very high price in 2007.  When it 
suffered losses from its proprietary trading, structured credit and 
derivatives activities in 2008, it held inadequate amounts of capital 
to absorb the financial shocks it was then exposed to.37  
 
These examples illustrate the particular problem for a universal bank, 
namely, that at any given moment, the entire bank is exposed to the 
risks borne by its investment banking work.  (The corollary is, of 
course, also true in that the investment banking arm is also exposed 
to the risks borne by the deposit-taking side, but the risks posed by 
the deposit-taking work of these banks are not documented as having 
                                                 
35 Financial Stability Board Interim Report of the FSB Workstream on Securities Lending and Repos 
Securities Lending and Repos: Market Overview and Financial Stability Issues 27 April (2012) 9.  Within 
the UK, many of these institutions were subject to oversight from the Financial Services Authority, but 
this would not have been for the purpose of monitoring their bank-like functions for their impact on the 
stability of the entire financial system.   
36 Financial Stability Board ‘2017 list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)’ 16 November 
(2018) available at financialstabilityboard.org. (Accessed 21 November 2018)  HBOS was subsequently 
acquired by Lloyds TSB in 2009.  Lloyds and TSB have since separated and Lloyds is no longer considered 
systemically important. RBS appeared on the 2017 list but was removed in 2018. 
37Vickers Report (n 8) 32-33. 
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been a cause of the financial crisis.)  In other words, the deposits of 
ordinary consumers and small businesses are put at risk if the bank’s 
investment banking obligations cannot be met, leading to the 
possibility of a run on the bank.  It also provides for the possibility of 
problems in the payments systems and this is a significant and 
potentially systemic problem as there is a risk of contagion because 
of the inter-connected nature of banks. 
 
An appreciation of this context is key to understanding the need (or 
not) for ring-fencing: it only takes a short leap of imagination to 
conclude that, if deposit-taking banks had not been exposed to these 
kinds of investment banking activities, the financial crisis might have 
been avoided, or at least, might not have been so severe.  One 
argument from history in support of this view is that advanced by US 
Senator Elizabeth Warren, who contends that the separation of high 
risk investment banking activities from commercial banking activities 
under the US Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, was responsible for a 
prolonged period of financial stability within the US until its repeal in 
1999.38 
 
If only matters were so clear cut.  The reality is that a bank’s 
investment banking activities may usefully be used to fund and 
support its retail banking functions, such as the payment of interest 
to depositors.  Banks have introduced innovative financial products 
to improve yield and securitisation models were adopted largely 
                                                 
38 Elizabeth Warren.  See http://elizabethwarren.com/blog/glass-steagall and sec 2 of ‘Findings and 
Purpose’ of the 21st Century Glass Steagall Act of 2013 (her Senate Bill) reintroduced on 7 July 2015 
and available at: http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/21stCenturyGlassSteagall.pdf.  See 
also http://www.doddfrankupdate.com/DFU/ArticlesDFU/Senators-reintroduce-bill-with-GlassSteagall-
prote-64276.aspx and John Authers ‘Markets make best case for Glass-Steagall’ 14 July 2013 at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/14e08822-eb04-11e2-9fcc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3gLjC8WaM (all 
accessed 4 January 2018). 
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because they were thought to reduce risk. So when undertaken 
carefully and correctly, many of the investment banking activities 
performed by banks in the period leading up to the financial crisis 
were perfectly sensible activities for them to undertake (and indeed, 
banks did not stop carrying out these activities after the crisis).  It is 
also the case that some activities cannot be compartmentalised easily 
into “retail bank functions” or “investment bank functions” since some 
retail customers may benefit from investment bank activities 
specifically designed to protect them from risk, for example, through 
interest rate or currency hedging arrangements.  Nor does this model 
necessarily address the position of banks which are solely retail or 
solely investment banks. 
 
But if retail bank functions are to be ring-fenced from investment 
bank functions, how is this best achieved?  This was considered by 
the Independent Commission on Banking in the Vickers Report, the 
recommendations of which form the basis for the UK model of ring-
fencing.39  The Vickers Report concluded that there were two main 
considerations in creating an effective ring-fence: first in determining 
the location of the fence, that is, what activities should be separated 
for protection within the ring-fence; and second, in determining the 
height of the fence, being the corporate structure through which 
“mandated” services could be isolated from “prohibited” investment 
banking activities.40  These elements will now be considered in more 
detail.  
 
 
                                                 
39 Independent Commission on Banking Final Report, Recommendations September 2011. 
40 Vickers Report (n 36) 36, 62.  
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Part Four: The UK Model of Ring-fencing41 
The Vickers Report determined that the purpose of ring-fencing was 
to isolate essential retail banking activities and insulate them from 
shocks within the financial system so that these essential services 
could be maintained in a financial crisis.  In addition, a ring-fence 
would curtail reliance on implicit government guarantees and enable 
failing banks to be more easily resolved without recourse to 
taxpayers’ funds.42  Whilst the Vickers Report acknowledged the work 
of the FSB, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”) 
and the EU in addressing capital issues, it took the view that the Basel 
baseline capital requirements were too low, particularly for G-SIBs 
and ultimately recommended a higher level of loss-absorbing 
capacity.43  It concluded that the combination of its proposed 
initiatives on ring-fencing and increased loss absorbing capacity 
would facilitate bank resolution and, as losses would not require 
taxpayer support, these initiatives would also enhance competition.44  
The focus in this part will be on the Vickers Report findings on ring-
fencing, the principles it outlined and how these have been translated 
into FSBRA 2013 and developed into the policy that will ultimately be 
applied to banks from 1 January 2019. 
 
The location of the fence 
                                                 
41 Although the focus of this paper is on ring-fencing, it is important to note that the ICB’s overall brief 
was to consider both structural and non-structural reforms, with a view to promoting financial stability 
and competition in the UK banking sector.41  Its proposals on ring-fencing were, therefore, one of a 
number of complementary policies.   
42 Vickers Report (n 36) 35. 
43 Vickers Report (n 36) 9, 13. 
44 Vickers Report (n 36) 14. 
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The Vickers Report designated the taking of retail deposits from and 
provision of overdrafts to both individuals and small and medium-
sized businesses (“SMEs”) as mandated services requiring protection 
and recognised the importance of maintaining payment services.  It 
is submitted that the identification of these services is 
uncontroversial; it is increasingly recognised that certain banking 
services are a form of public utility and that public access to them is 
essential for daily life. 45  Any temporary interruption to continuity of 
these banking services would cause problems within the wider 
economy and, as consumers and SMEs generally have no alternative 
to using banks for the provision of these services, they would be badly 
affected by their withdrawal. 46  The Greek credit controls that were 
imposed in the summer of 2015 and which led to an extended bank 
holiday are illustrative of the real hardship that the suspension or 
limitation of these functions can cause to individuals and SMEs.47   
 
The first principle of the Vickers Report was that “only ring-fenced 
banks should be granted permission by the UK regulator to provide 
mandated services”.48  The principle was intended to apply to any 
bank permitted by the regulator to carry on business in the UK as a 
distinct legal entity.  This meant that the principle would apply to 
deposit-taking UK banks which were part of a banking group, whether 
their headquarters were in the UK or whether they were the UK bank 
subsidiary of a group with headquarters in another jurisdiction.49 
 
                                                 
45 See the discussion in the House of Commons Treasury Committee Fifth Report of Session ‘The Run 
on the Rock’ (1) (2008) 75. 
46 Vickers Report (n 36) 38. 
47 BBC (n 18). 
48 This definition included building societies.  Vickers Report (n 8) 38. 
49 Vickers Report (n 8) 39. 
18 
 
Principle 2 identified the activities which a ring-fenced bank should 
be prohibited from undertaking.  These were, broadly, activities that 
would impede the possibility of the bank’s resolution or increase its 
exposure to the global financial markets, plus any activities that were 
not directly relevant to the provision of payment or credit 
intermediation services in the non-financial sector. Activities that 
might threaten the objectives of the ring-fence would also be 
prohibited.50  So whilst the Vickers Report concluded that wholesale 
and investment banking services were not integral to the credit 
intermediation process, it also recognised the importance of the 
distinction between lending to the financial sector and the non-
financial sector.  Its approach was, therefore, nuanced: it was not a 
question of a “blanket ban” on certain activities, but a consideration 
of the extent to which they breached the principles it had identified.   
 
FSBRA 2013 has adopted much from the Vickers Report in relation to 
the location of the fence.  It defines a “ring-fenced body” as a UK 
institution, incorporated in the UK and which has been authorised51 
to carry on a core activity.  Although FSBRA 2013 refers to both “core 
activities” and “core services”, the only defined core activity is that of 
deposit-taking.  Core services are services that are linked to core 
activities and, consistently with the Vickers Report, comprise deposit, 
overdraft and payment services.52  The ring-fencing rules are 
intended only to apply to institutions that take deposits as a core 
activity and so entities with a core activity below £25 billion will be 
exempt.53   
                                                 
50 Ibid (n 8) 52-53. 
51 Under Part 4A of FSMA. 
52 FSBRA 2013 section 4(1) inserting new FSMA sections 142B and 142C. 
53 FSBRA 2013 section 4(1) inserting new FSMA section 142A and FSMA 2000 (Ring-fenced Bodies and 
Core Activities) Order 2014, SI 2014/1960, Article 12.   Article 2 recognises that some high net worth 
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The critical part of the location of the ring-fence concerns the 
activities that a ring-fenced bank cannot undertake; in other words 
the excluded activities.54  Dealing in investments as principal is the 
only activity stated to be excluded under FSBRA 2013, although the 
Treasury can make orders excepting an entity from this exclusion as 
well as adding other activities to the list of excluded activities or 
prohibiting ring-fenced entities from involvement in specific 
activities.55  Any prohibition would be based on the activity adversely 
affecting the provision of core services.   
 
Despite the fact that many of the recommendations of the Vickers 
Report have been reflected in the new legislation it is less than clear 
how effective they will be.  For example, the Treasury has the power 
to make orders to enable institutions to avoid the ring-fencing 
requirements in certain circumstances.  It seems unlikely that the 
Treasury would rush to make such orders unless it was appropriate 
to do so as this would be politically inexpedient (particularly since the 
implementation of ring-fencing was included in the 2015 
Conservative party manifesto).56  The political position may, as a 
result of the new government team after the Brexit vote, however, 
no longer be the same.  Although noting his bank’s commitment to 
ring-fencing, the Chairman of HSBC has indicated in the past that the 
bank is unhappy about the costs associated with its implementation 
                                                 
individuals who are sophisticated investors may wish to make deposits in excess of the £85,000 that is 
protected under the UK deposit guarantee scheme and such deposits are excluded from the definition 
of core deposit.  Building societies are specifically excluded from the scope of the rules although FSBRA 
2013 section 7 anticipates that amendments may be made to the Building Societies Act 1986 if 
necessary; they will usually be exempt because if their size. 
54 FSBRA 2013 section 4(1) inserting new FSMA section 142G. 
55 For example, entering into specified kinds of transactions, setting up a branch in a specified territory 
or holding specified shares.  FSBRA 2013 section 4(1) inserting new FSMA sections 142D and 142E. 
56Available at https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto, p9 (accessed 29 July 2015). 
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and has suggested that ring-fencing may not carry the benefits 
envisaged by its proponents.  Ring-fencing is also one of a number of 
reasons previously cited by the board of HSBC for a possible 
relocation of its headquarters from the UK.57  Although this may 
simply have been low level sabre-rattling by HSBC, if the UK 
government were to consider that HSBC’s move to another 
jurisdiction would be a loss to the standing of the UK in the financial 
markets, they may be inclined to soften their stance on the strength 
of the ring-fence.58  With much of the work on ring-fencing now 
complete, this may now be less of an issue.  To the extent that it 
remains a concern, it must be noted that there has been no indication 
of the current, post-Brexit government’s views on ring-fencing 
although this may only be because of its pre-occupation with Brexit 
itself; it seems likely that any loss of HSBC’s UK business would  be 
perceived as a detriment to the standing of the UK in a post-Brexit 
world.59  
 
The fact that the Treasury may make orders carries the prospect that 
they will attract little scrutiny.  Whether this is a matter of real 
concern will depend upon the rigour of the oversight provided by the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”) and the Financial Conduct 
Authority (“FCA”) which will be responsible for monitoring the 
activities of ring-fenced bodies.60  Bearing in mind that the regulators’ 
                                                 
57Jonathan Symonds, Chairman of HSBC Bank plc and George Culmer, Executive Director and Chief 
Financial Officer of Lloyds Banking Group both attended the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee 
on 30 June 2015. For Mr Symonds remarks, see Parliamentlivetv (n 4) 16.36 minutes. 
58 The focus of HSBC’s business means that implementing ring-fencing will be more costly than it would 
be for other banks: 97% of Lloyds business is in retail banking compared to 30-40% of HSBCs.  
Parliamentlivetv (n 4) 16.46 minutes. 
59 According to the Independent newspaper on 30 October 2017, HSBC may move up to 1,000 staff 
from London to Paris following Brexit. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/brexit-
latest-news-hsbc-bank-jobs-move-paris-city-london-leave-eu-a8027131.html> accessed 5 January 
2018. 
60 Although it is not anticipated that there will be any ring-fenced bodies that will not be subject to PRA 
authorisation.  See Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority Consultation Paper I CP19/14 ‘The 
21 
 
remit is to ensure that the business of a ring-fenced-body is 
conducted so that it avoids any adverse effect on the continuity of 
the provision of core services in the UK,61 individual banks should 
only benefit from a relaxation of the rules where the regulators are 
satisfied that there will be no such adverse effect.  This protection 
assumes, however, that the regulator and the Treasury will form the 
same opinion, since it is the opinion of the Treasury, rather than the 
regulator, that is applied in this event.62  Although this provision is 
aimed at smaller institutions which have limited impact within the 
global market place, it is possible that, as memories of the financial 
crisis start to fade and no obvious disasters ensue, there could be a 
gradual “creep” in the number of banks subject to such relaxations 
and a consequent re-exposure of retail banks to investment banking 
activities.   
 
Whilst the exclusion from dealing in investments as principal is a 
blanket ban, the legislation reflects the need for a ring-fenced body 
to be able to operate commercially.63  Not all derivatives contracts 
are prohibited (for example, those to enable customers to hedge their 
interest rate or currency arrangements), although they are subject to 
a number of limitations.64  How easy it will be in practice to determine 
whether a ring-fenced body is undertaking a particular transaction as 
principal or in order to, for example, hedge a customer risk, may 
                                                 
implementation of ring-fencing: consultation on legal structure, governance and the continuity of 
services and facilities’ October (2014) 9. 
61 FSBRA 2013 sections 1 and 2 respectively amend the FSMA 2B PRA objective to include ring fenced 
bodies and create a FSMA FCA continuity objective in respect of ring-fenced bodies. 
62 FSMA 142D (3). 
63 SI 2014/2080 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Excluded Activities and Prohibitions) 
Order 2014.  Part 2 sets out the excluded activities and exceptions.  Commodities trading is permitted, 
for example, where the commodities are required for the ring-fenced body’s own use or their use by 
one of its subsidiaries (Article 5(2)).  
64 SI 2014/2080 Articles 9-12 (n 59).  For example, not exceeding a position risk greater than 0.5% of 
the ring-fenced body’s own funds.  There are a number of other parameters. 
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prove challenging.  The latest PRA guidance indicates that the 
reporting requirements for banks require information to be provided 
only insofar as is necessary for the PRA to understand “where firms 
are potentially not compliant, or are taking risks that might adversely 
affect the continuity of provision of core services” which is suggestive 
of a pragmatic approach.65 
 
The height of the fence 
The last two principles identified in the Vickers Report relate to the 
height of the fence.  Principle 4 addressed the extent of the legal and 
operational links between a ring-fenced bank and the rest of its 
corporate group and principle 5 the scope of its economic links with 
other group members.   Mindful of the benefits of universal banking, 
the Vickers Report recommended that services necessary for the ring-
fenced part of the bank to operate should be separable from the non-
ring-fenced part, so that ring-fenced activities could continue if the 
non-ring-fenced part failed.  Additionally, access to the payments 
system should only be through a ring-fenced bank to avoid issues of 
operational and liquidity risk66 and relationships with non-EEA 
institutions should be limited.  All relationships between the non-ring-
fenced and the ring-fenced parts of the bank should be conducted at 
arm’s length and the ring-fenced element should be able to meet 
regulatory requirements as to capital and liquidity on a standalone 
basis.67  In this way, the Vickers Report distinguished its concept of 
ring-fencing from the Glass-Steagall model; its version was a 
                                                 
65 PRA Policy Statement PS3/17 ‘The implementation of ring-fencing: reporting and residual matters- 
responses to CP25/16 and Chapter 5 of CP36/16’ February 2017. 
66 Vickers Report (n 36) 67. 
67 Ibid (n 36) 71-72; SI 2014/2080 Article 13. 
23 
 
“halfway house” through which a degree of separation could be 
enforced in order to provide the benefits of stability.68 
 
These recommendations have been adopted by FSBRA 201369 and 
taken forward in the final rules issued by the PRA.70  The PRA has 
opted for a “sibling structure” within a banking group which enables 
a non-ring-fenced UK holding company to cluster its subsidiaries into 
ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced groups.71  As subsidiaries of ring-
fenced bodies must themselves conduct only ring-fenced activities, 
this structure is intended not only to simplify the process of resolving 
the ring-fenced body in the event of the group’s insolvency, but also 
to prevent investment banking risks from flowing into it.72   
 
A localised ring-fence has also been established, in that a ring-fenced 
body (which could include the UK subsidiary of a foreign bank if it 
meets the threshold on deposits) cannot have a branch or a 
participating interest73 in an undertaking carrying out regulated 
activities outside an EEA member state.74  As the ring-fence does not 
apply to foreign banks with branches in the UK or to UK banks with 
                                                 
68 Ibid (n 36) 66. 
69 FSBRA 2013 section 4 inserting new FSMA sections 142H, I and J. 
70 PRA Policy Statement PS20/16 ‘The implementation of ring-fencing: prudential requirements, 
intragroup arrangements and use of financial market infrastructures’ July 2016.  There have been 
several iterations of the rules.  Much of the detail was set out in the original PRA Consultation Paper 
CP19/14 in October 2014.  These were followed by Policy Statement PS10/15 ‘The implementation of 
ring-fencing: legal structure, governance and the continuity of services and facilities’ which indicated 
that no major changes to the proposals were necessitated (see PS10/15 5).  Further consultations 
subsequently took place with the issue of CP33/15 ‘The implementation of ring-fencing: the PRA’s 
approach to ring-fencing transfer schemes’ September (2015); CP37/15 ‘The implementation of ring-
fencing, prudential requirements, intragroup arrangements and use of financial markets infrastructures’ 
October (2015); and CP38/15 ‘Ensuring operational continuity in resolution’ October (2015).  All are 
available at www.bankofengland.co.uk (accessed 5 January 2018). 
71 See PRA Supervisory Statement SS8/16 ‘Ring-fenced Bodies (RFBs)’ December 2017 Chapter 2. 
Available at www.bankofengland.co.uk (accessed 5 January 2018).   
72 Ibid. 
73 A participating interest is defined in section 421A FSMA “an interest held by an undertaking in the 
shares of another undertaking which it holds on a long-term basis for the purpose of securing a 
contribution to its activities by the exercise of control or influence arising from or related to that 
interest”.  A 20% shareholding is assumed to be a participating interest. 
74 SI 2014/2080 (n 47) Article 20.  Although the 
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non-ring-fenced subsidiaries in other jurisdictions, the ring-fence is 
not thought to affect the competitive conditions in the wider financial 
markets.  Limiting any interest in an undertaking based outside the 
EEA to one that is less than a participating interest will, presumably, 
encourage any non-EEA entity to create a subsidiary in the UK if it 
wanted to undertake ring-fenced work (as was envisaged in the 
Vickers Report).  Ironically, the rules would permit a UK bank to re-
locate to an EEA jurisdiction and then set up a branch in the UK that 
would not be governed by the ring-fencing requirements, but this 
seems an unlikely outcome.  First, it would damage the reputation of 
any bank that decided to do this (at a time when the reputation of 
banks is not high with the public).  Second, it would be costly for a 
bank to transfer its retail customers as individual depositor consents 
would be required.75  
 
The requirement for economic separation relies heavily on the notion 
that the board of the ring-fenced body will act independently of its 
UK holding company.76  To this end, the PRA has set out rules as to 
the composition of the board as well as a determination of when a 
director is to be regarded as independent.77  As a matter of general 
company law, the directors of a company are required to act in the 
best interests of their company, so it is worth exploring why this 
additional protection is thought necessary.78  In a complex corporate 
banking group the board of the ultimate holding company will set the 
strategy and direction for the group as a whole, which will have 
                                                 
75 Vickers Report (n 36) 65. 
76 James Proudman ‘Putting up a fence’ (n 27) 4. 
77 The chair and half the board must be non-executives.  PRA 2016/26 ‘PRA Rulebook: CRR Firms and 
Non-Authorised Persons: Ring-Fenced Bodies Instrument 2016’, Chapter 4 Board Composition and 
Membership. Available at: http://www.prarulebook.co.uk/rulebook/Media/Get/a3acd4bd-9807-47c3-
9f33-3236c3022a18/PRA2016-26/pdf accessed 5 January 2018. 
78 Section 172 Companies Act 2006. 
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implications for the workings of its subsidiaries.  Where these 
subsidiaries are ring-fenced bodies, potential conflicts may arise if the 
corporate direction requires those ring-fenced bodies to undertake an 
activity that may weaken or breach the ring-fence.  This tension 
raises two issues for corporate groups: first, will the ring-fenced body 
be able to resist the pressure from its parent; and second, a question 
raised by Lord Lamont, as to why would the parent want to own a 
company that it could not control?79 
 
The second issue is more easily resolved than the first: if the ultimate 
parent of a ring-fenced body does not like the loss of control that 
results from the implementation of ring-fencing, then it can simply 
sell the retail side of the bank.80  The first issue is more difficult, as it 
relates to the culture of the organisation and the ability of the 
directors of the ring-fenced body to resist pressure that may be 
exerted upon them by senior executives to lift, or somehow modify, 
the ring-fence.  Whilst a director may be able to resist overt pressure, 
it may be harder if the pressure is subliminal; as Keay observes, 
directors (like anyone else) are not always aware that they are 
affected by bias.81   
 
The directors of a ring-fenced body could take comfort from section 
172(3) Companies Act 2006 should they face pressure from their 
parent to relax the ring-fence requirements.  It is accepted that where 
                                                 
79 Discussed in the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee on 30 June 2015.  Lord Lamont asked 
“why own something you can’t control?”  Parliamentlivetv (n 4) 16.00 mins. 
80 Sir John Vickers considered separation could be the best course in such a case but did not think that 
this was a “killer” objection to ring-fencing.  Parliamentlivetv (n 4) 16.00 mins. 
 
81 Andrew Keay ‘Authorising Directors’ Conflicts of Interest’ (2012) 12 1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
129, 144.  The focus of Professor Keay’s paper is on section 175 Companies Act 2006 and so is not on 
all fours with the present discussion, but the points on bias and independence are instructive. 
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a company is in financial difficulties, the duty of its directors shifts 
from a duty owed to the company to a duty owed to its creditors 
which, in the context of a ring-fenced bank, would include its 
depositors.  Since the purpose of ring-fencing is to protect depositors 
from insolvency, it makes sense for the directors to have regard to 
their interests.  The difficulty for the directors in relying on this 
provision is likely to be one of timing, since any request to avoid the 
ring-fencing requirements is likely to be made precisely because the 
company is not in financial difficulties and the insolvency risk to it is 
perceived to be low, whereas the shift in duty to creditors is generally 
invoked at a point at which a company is in extremis. 
 
Beyond the board, responsibility for achieving the ring-fencing 
objectives will extend to Senior Managers for their specific area of 
business.82  Senior Managers are to be vetted for their roles as part 
of the drive to regulate better the conduct of workers in the financial 
services industry.  In addition, the board would be required to work 
closely with the PRA in its role of monitoring and enforcing the ring-
fencing regime.83   In the event that the PRA considers that a ring-
fenced body within a banking group is being prevented from acting 
independently or is being adversely affected by the acts or omissions 
of other group member, then the PRA can restructure the group.  This 
is the so-called “electrification” of the fence.  The PRA can also 
exercise its restructuring powers where another member of the group 
has become insolvent and either cannot provide the ring-fenced body 
                                                 
82 PRA Rulebook CRR Firms, Allocation of Responsibilities Rules 3.4 and 4.2(4). 
83 The provisions relating to senior management functions are set out in Part 4 of FSBRA 2013 and 
amend sections 59-66 FSMA. 
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with necessary services or the effect of the insolvency means that the 
ring fenced-body cannot continue its core activities.84 
  
The PRA recognises that a degree of pragmatism will be necessary 
when implementing the rules, as different organisations will have 
different requirements and so has said that it will take a 
“proportionate approach”.85  How well banks will deal with intra-group 
challenges remains to be seen, but it must be remembered that they 
are sophisticated organisations and used to dealing with internal 
conflicts.  They are also in the process of a cultural shift away from 
perverse incentives towards providing better service to customers.86  
This would suggest that, on balance, these mechanisms will enable 
directors to maintain the necessary independence for ensuring that 
the ring-fencing objectives are met.  There is a practical concern in 
relation to the constitution of the boards, however.  The pool of 
people with the skill set necessary to take on the role of independent 
director is very small, so the appointment of directors may prove 
difficult.  As Katz points out, not only will it be hard to find people to 
apply, but people may be put off from applying if they are restricted 
from holding other directorships elsewhere.87 
 
The structural separation that will be achieved by limiting the location 
of the work of ring-fenced bodies to the EEA has already been 
mentioned and it is here that the interface between the role of bank 
capitalisation and the concept of “geographical” ring-fencing become 
                                                 
84 FSBRA 2013 section 4(1) inserting new FSMA section 142K. 
85 See PRA SS8/16 para 2.5 (n  ) and PRA PS3/17 para 4.3 (n ).  By way of example, a particular concern 
Lloyds Banking Group raised with the PRA was to ask whether it could avoid having a separate board 
for its investment banking work in view its small size.  Parliamentlivetv (n 4). 
86 According to the Chief Operating Officer of Lloyds Banking Group.  Parliamentlivetv (n 4) 17.12 mins. 
87 Etay Katz ‘UK Bank ring-fencing: how will you build yours?’ (2015) 1 Journal of International Banking 
and Finance Law 30. 
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important.  A bank’s location will be a factor in the outcome of its 
resolution, largely because banks have traditionally been stress 
tested on a consolidated basis.  Cerutti and Schmieder have observed 
a general assumption drawn from stress tests that money available 
in one jurisdiction will be available to members of the same group 
based in other jurisdictions.88  This is not always borne out in practice, 
however, as local regulators tend to focus on national financial 
stability in periods of financial crisis89 when a host regulator may 
prevent funds from leaving branches of foreign banks based in its 
jurisdiction.  So a bank that anticipated redistributing funds from one 
jurisdiction to another in order to stave off a bank failure elsewhere 
may be prevented from doing so to its detriment.  The same situation 
may also arise in reverse in a case where a subsidiary in a host 
country may not be supported by a parent in the home jurisdiction.  
Cerutti and Schmieder conclude that this is less like to be a problem 
for banks where a similar approach to crises is adopted across 
jurisdictions (they cite the EU as an example) and that simply working 
on the basis of a consolidated balance sheet is not enough to ensure 
that a bank is protected in a financial crisis; unconsolidated data will 
give a truer representation of the bank’s position.90 
 
The PRA policy for determining the prudential requirements for ring-
fenced bodies is based on the sibling structure it has advocated.  This 
structure enables capital and liquidity requirements to be “sub-
consolidated”, so that the prudential requirements for ring-fenced 
                                                 
88 Eugenio Cerutti and Christian Schmieder ‘Ring fencing and consolidated banks’ stress tests’ (2014) 
11 Journal of Financial Stability 1, 2.     
89 See, for example, D’Hulster and Ötker-Robe (n 14).  Most obviously for reasons of political expediency. 
 
90 Eugenio Cerutti and Christian Schmieder ‘Ring fencing and consolidated banks’ stress tests’ (2014) 
11 Journal of Financial Stability 1, 2.  Although it must be noted that the EU was not immune to this 
problem during the financial crisis. See, for example, D’Hulster and Ötker-Robe (n 14).   
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bodies can be consolidated within the ring-fenced arm of the business 
whilst remaining distinct from the non-ring-fenced part.91  Combined 
with a more unified approach to bank restructuring across the EU 
under the BRRD (which will shortly be discussed), it is likely that the 
UK approach will help to overcome some of the disadvantages caused 
by geographical ring-fencing.   
 
As noted above, it is not surprising that the ring-fencing requirements 
have not been welcomed by all those banks in the UK which will be 
affected by them. The reasons include the complexity of compliance 
and the additional costs associated with it.  However, Antonio Horta-
Osorio, Lloyds Bank Chief Executive believes that the “the principle 
behind it is right” and he did not feel it would be “too burdensome”. 
Others however disagree with views ranging from it being ‘actively 
harmful to the UK’ to the extra costs being passed on to customers.92   
Particular concerns have recently been expressed in relation to Brexit 
as this is putting additional pressure on banks.  Two particular 
difficulties for banks are first, that it is not clear what the passporting 
arrangements will be post-Brexit and second that it is not clear how 
the transition period (which would enable an orderly exit) will work.93 
This means that the five major UK banks are trying to deal with two 
sets of deadlines to accommodate the restructuring associated with 
                                                 
91 PRA SS8/16 Chapter 3.  Sub-consolidation is permitted under the CRR (n16) Article 11(5) and ring-
fenced bodies will be expected to comply with certain obligations under CRD IV (n 16) including capital 
adequacy, liquidity and Pillar 2 reporting. 
92 Financial Times, ‘Global banks at odds over ring-fencing rules in UK’ London 20 June 2015. 
93 The UK Government remains unclear on its approach to the transition and post-Brexit arrangements 
at the time of writing.  In his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 25 January 2018 the 
Chancellor Phillip Hammond stated that "We are taking two completely interconnected and aligned 
economies with high levels of trade between them and selectively moving them - hopefully very 
modestly - apart", whilst the BBC subsequently reported a Downing Street spokesman as saying that 
"While we want a deep and special economic partnership with the EU after we leave, these could not be 
described as very modest changes." BBC news report available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-42827270 (accessed 26 January 2018). 
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ring-fencing as well as any restructuring needed for their businesses 
post-Brexit in the absence of a deal.94 
 
Having considered the UK model of ring-fencing that is shortly to be 
implemented, it now makes sense briefly to consider the approach to 
ring-fencing taken in the US to appreciate the lessons that may be 
learned both from its historical implementation in the form of the 
Glass-Steagall Act,95 as well as its current iteration. 
 
Part Five: The US Model of Ring-fencing 
In 1933, approximately four years after the Wall Street Crash and the 
subsequent wave of bank failures, the US Congress passed the Glass-
Steagall Act which effectively separated deposit taking banks from 
investment banks. This remained in place until 1999 when the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act removed this separation.96  When the 
financial crisis hit in 2008, many observers pointed to the removal of 
the ring-fence as the main cause of the financial crisis.97  An analogy 
can perhaps be drawn between the behaviour of US banks during the 
booming economic period of the 1920s and their behaviour in the 
period between the repeal of Glass-Steagall and the start of the crisis 
in 2007/8.  
 
Interestingly, although the US authorities took action in the wake of 
the recent crisis, the approach was not to reintroduce a Glass-
Steagall form of ring-fencing.  Instead, the US approach following the 
                                                 
94 Financial Times online ‘Regulators get ready to authorise ‘ring-fenced’ UK banks’ 19 August 2017 
available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/5ca81a48-8372-11e7-a4ce-15b2513cb3ff> accessed 5 
January 2018.   
95 It was actually part of the Banking Act 1933 rather than a separate Act. 
96 This was very controversial as many claimed that it was the powerful US banking lobby which 
managed to convince President Clinton that this development would be better for the US economy. 
97 See, for example, the comments of Senator Elizabeth Warren. 
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financial crisis was to prohibit deposit-taking banks whose deposits 
are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) 
from “engaging in proprietary trading and from acquiring or retaining 
ownership interests in, sponsoring, or having certain relationships 
with a hedge fund or private equity fund”, subject to various 
exemptions and exceptions.98  So rather than re-introduce a ring-
fence, the new approach is to separate permitted activities from those 
that are prohibited. 
 
This is now generally referred to as the Volcker Rule after Paul Volcker 
who had been the Chairman of the Federal Reserve and who was 
instrumental in its design. One of the criticisms of the Volcker Rule is 
that the definitions in the legislation lack precision.  This has meant 
that it has been difficult to identify the distinction between permitted 
and prohibited activities and, therefore, the extent of its application.  
In order for the rule to be enforced, institutions are required to report 
to the regulator to enable compliance to be monitored.  The 
prohibitions are aimed at preventing activities which are perceived to 
bear too high a risk. These include prohibiting proprietary trading 
which means that deposit-taking banks are not allowed to trade in 
certain forms of securities on their own behalf as principal and also 
that deposit-taking banks are not permitted to have any ownership 
interests in such vehicles as hedge funds and private equity funds. 
The approach is significantly different to that of the Glass-Steagall 
legislation and the UK ring-fencing model, in that the Volcker Rule 
does not require the complete separation of all investment banking 
                                                 
98 From the explanation of the Volcker Rule by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.  Available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/volcker-rule/faq.htm.  The prohibition appears in section 
619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (US) which added a new section 
13 to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (US).  
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activities from commercial banking activities.  It does mean, 
however, that deposit-taking banks cannot get involved in high-risk 
activities where they trade as principal.  As with the UK regime, there 
are exemptions to enable customers to take part in specific, low risk 
hedging transactions and so both regimes achieve similar outcomes.  
 
The Volcker Rule, although in force since 2012, has not yet been fully 
applied with a number of time extensions for compliance having been 
granted. Indeed in August 2016 a number of leading investment 
banks have asked the Federal Reserve to allow a further extension 
until 2022.99   As President Trump has already suggested that Dodd-
Frank will be repealed, it may prove to be the case that the Volcker 
Rule never actually becomes fully effective.  
 
Part 6: Concluding Thoughts  
The UK’s ring-fencing policy will go some way both towards ensuring 
the continuity of banking services in an insolvent banking group and 
in achieving the objectives set out in the Vickers Report.  Based on 
the recent Italian financial crisis, it seems clear that it would enhance 
the confidence of depositors in the UK’s financial system. While it 
seems unlikely that UK depositors would not have trust in the FSCS 
to provide the level of protection which has been guaranteed, the 
existence of the ring-fence, if it proves to be effective, should make 
it far less likely that the provision of compensation to depositors 
would ever be necessary. 
 
                                                 
99 www.cnbc.com ‘EXCLUSIVE Wall St banks ask Fed for 5 more years to comply with Volcker Rule’ by 
Olivia Oran 11/8/16.  Accessed 7/1/17. 
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The strengths of the UK model are first, the separate capitalisation of 
ring-fenced bodies as this should help to protect core services from 
financial system shocks and second, the direct connection of the ring-
fenced body to the payments systems to prevent contagion.  It also 
seems likely that ring-fencing will facilitate the resolution process, 
since the pre-resolution separation of business lines at an operational 
and economic level should help speed up any future resolution 
process.  Despite this, it remains open to question whether the 
Vickers Report objective that ring-fencing will reduce the amount of 
taxpayers’ money that will be required if a G-SIB were to fail in the 
future will be met.   
 
Ring-fencing has undoubtedly been very expensive to introduce with 
ongoing costs for the banks estimated to be somewhere between 
£1.7bn and £4.4bn per year.100  Nor will the costs of ring-fencing be 
evenly spread across banks, as the ultimate bill for any bank will 
depend upon the extent of its international activities as well as its 
balance of core activities to non-core (investment type) activities. 
HSBC has previously questioned whether it is strictly necessary to 
implement ring-fencing at a time when banks are under pressure to 
improve their customer service and governance arrangements as well 
as implementing all the other post-crisis legislative initiatives, all of 
which carry their own costs.  The external pressures on UK banks 
have worsened, post-Brexit101 whilst at the same time, they must 
                                                 
100HM Treasury ‘Banking reform: draft secondary legislation’ July (2013) 78 available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/223566/PU1488_Ban
king_reform_consultation_-_online-1.pdf (accessed 2 November 2015).  See also James Proudman 
‘Putting up a fence’ (n 27) 4: ring-fencing is “expected to have cost the industry several billion pounds 
in total by 2019”. 
101 As discussed in Part Four. 
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introduce “arguably, the largest ever discrete change to the structure 
of the UK banking system.”102 
 
Despite this, the proportionate approach that has been taken by the 
PRA to the implementation of ring-fencing suggests an element of 
pragmatism and a business-like intention to making it work.  The 
rules have been carefully considered through consultation and the 
implementation will be phased over 2018 in order to deal with any 
problems as they arise and suggesting a clarity in approach that is 
lacking in the application of the US Volcker Rule.   
 
Although the UK banks have no choice about ring-fencing, it is 
nonetheless worth reflecting whether it is a model that should be 
adopted elsewhere, particularly within the EU, to the extent that the 
UK model could damage EU business as a result of unfavourable 
regulatory arbitrage.  This analysis requires a consideration of the 
place of ring-fencing amongst the raft of other regulatory and 
prudential requirements that have been introduced in recent years 
which will now briefly be considered.     
 
The gradual implementation of the FSB’s Key Attributes for Effective 
Resolution Regimes103 has led to the creation of crisis management 
groups and cross-border cooperation agreements (“COAGs”) for G-
SIBs and G-SIFIs, enabling discussions to take place on a regular and 
planned basis between home and host regulators as to how complex 
                                                 
102 James Proudman ‘Putting up the fence’ (n ) 3. 
103 Financial Stability Board ‘Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes’, October 2011 and the 
Financial Stability Board Report to G20 Leaders ‘Overview of Progress in the Implementation of the G20 
Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability’, 14 November 2014. (Available at 
www.financialstabilityboard.org, accessed 25 June 2015). 
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bank resolutions will be managed.104  The BRRD requires banks to 
produce RRPs setting out their plans for recovery and resolution 
(including mechanisms for the separation of viable parts of the 
business) in the event that their financial position deteriorates.  This 
means that there is some duplication of effort for banks that also 
have to produce a ring-fencing model.105  The point of the RRPs is to 
enable national regulators to work across borders, respecting each 
other Member State’s arrangements so that EU wide banking groups 
can be resolved in an orderly fashion.  The existence of such coherent 
arrangements coupled with the implementation of new prudential and 
regulatory mechanisms across the EU may be enough to address the 
problems of cross-border bank failure to which ring-fencing will add 
little.  The position with the US is slightly different; after all, the 
memorandum of understanding on the resolution of a G-SIFI that 
exists between the UK and the US is not based on an underlying legal 
framework.  The fact that Australia (a country similar to the UK in 
that it has a few, dominant banks) has actively decided not to ring-
fence on the basis that it will work on its other regulatory measures 
is, however, persuasive. 
 
Great improvements have been also made within the UK and EU 
strengthening depositor protection regime.106  In 2007, there were 
differing levels of depositor protection available in different Member 
States and within some, including the UK, the depositor protection 
arrangements included an element of coinsurance, which 
exacerbated the Northern Rock crisis when customers realised that 
                                                 
104 FSB Key Attribute 8 (n7). 
105 BRRD (n 5) and FSB Key Attributes (n 7).  Under the BRRD, small institutions have simplified 
obligations. 
106 For a useful overview of the changes see Jennifer Payne ‘The Reform of Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes in Europe’ ECFR (2015) 539-562. 
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they would not get full compensation for their deposits.107  The DGSD 
was subsequently amended to harmonise the position within the EU 
by ensuring that all Member States guaranteed deposits up to 
€100,000108 and further improvements have since been made with 
regard to the timing of payouts to customers.109  In addition, the 
DGSD now requires Member States to contribute to an ex ante funded 
scheme of up to 0.8% of covered deposits, although Member States 
have until 2024 to achieve this.110  Nevertheless, a number of 
Member States are currently significantly below that target111 and the 
events in Italy seem to suggest that consumers there lack confidence 
in the local deposit protection arrangements to compensate them.   
 
But it is submitted that the depositor protection argument is an 
insufficient reason to introduce ring-fencing across the EU; improved 
prudential regulation, bank recovery and resolution efforts and 
deposit guarantee mechanisms have, as Governor Carney suggested, 
significantly improved the position since the financial crisis.  The 
depositor protection regime should continue to strengthen over the 
next six years and it is hard to see how the enormous cost of ring-
fencing is justified. 
 
The counter-argument from Vickers has always been that, whatever 
the costs to the banks of ring-fencing, they will be less than the costs 
to the taxpayer of a bail out. 112  Yet despite his assertion, there are 
other risks within the wider financial system that may prevent this 
                                                 
107 The Run on the Rock 
108 DGSD 2009 (n 1) 
109 Recast DGSD 2014 (n 1). 
110 Recast DGSD 2014 Art 10(2). 
111 EBA Report (n ). 
112 Vickers (n 3). 
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costs outcome.  Even in the absence of a financial crisis, ring-fencing 
is likely to slow down capital flows and increase transaction costs.113  
In the context of a financial crisis, although much has been done to 
standardise resolution processes internationally, not all national 
regulators will necessarily revert to the COAGs and co-operate on the 
cross-border lines that were envisaged in the resolution planning 
stage.  It would still be possible for capital to be retained in one 
jurisdiction and withheld from others even within a separately 
capitalised, ring-fenced part of a banking group, albeit that this is less 
likely to be a real problem where the arrangements are put in place 
as part of pre-resolution planning and so are transparent (as will be 
the case with the UK’s ring-fencing regime).114 
 
Another factor that will have an impact on the ultimate cost-benefit 
analysis of ring-fencing is bail in.  Although great reliance has been 
placed on bail in, it is untested and, as has been identified by Zhou 
and others, it could result in the transfer of losses from banks to other 
parts of the financial system (such as pension funds or insurance 
companies) which may also then require government (and therefore, 
taxpayer) support.115  If this is the case, even if core services are 
protected through ring-fencing, it will still have been as a 
consequence of a bail out elsewhere in the financial system and the 
wider objectives of the ring-fencing policy will have failed as ordinary 
people will still have been affected. Although it will be difficult to 
                                                 
113 FSB paper (n ). 
114 Problems tend to arise in cases of information asymmetry and where either home or host regulators 
are uncertain as to the efficacy of resolution processes in other relevant jurisdictions.  See D’Hulster 
and Otker-Robe (n 14 ) 173. 
115 J. Zhou, V. Rutledge, W Bossu, M. Dobler, N. Jassaud and M. Moore ‘From bail-out to bail-in: 
mandatory debt restructuring of systemic financial institutions’ (2012) IMF Staff Discussion Note 
SDN/12/03, 22; David Mayes ‘Bank structure and resolution’ (2014) 11 Journal of International Banking 
and Financial Law 743A 
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attempt to quantify the impact of a bail in on institutional investors, 
more data on this would be valuable.116   
 
The Vickers Report has focused squarely on trying to avoid the 
financial instability faced by a universal bank in the event of losses 
caused by its investment banking arm and has given little attention 
to the position of deposit-taking institutions that are not part of a 
universal bank.  But how realistic is this this model, bearing in mind 
that a number of the institutions that failed during the financial crisis 
were not universal banks?  Although Northern Rock was involved in 
the wholesale banking markets, it was an entirely retail deposit-
taking institution as were Bradford and Bingley and Dunfermline 
Building Societies.  Conversely, Lehmans was purely an investment 
bank.  It is hard to see how ring-fencing would have helped any of 
these institutions, although the post-crisis improvement in 
supervisory and prudential measures would certainly have done.    
 
There is also a school of thought that suggests that simply regulating 
to combat risk will not work. Persaud contends that “ring-fencing 
different sectors of the financial system does not make it safer.  It 
could make it less safe by restricting natural fits between risk and 
risk capacity”.117  His point is that in attempting to reduce risk 
through regulation, the risk does not disappear, it simply translates 
itself into a different risk that is not necessarily anticipated.  By way 
of example, he observes that the pre-2008 financial model was the 
                                                 
116 T. Conlon and J. Cotter have retrospectively applied the bail in framework to the European banks 
and concluded that depositors would not have required bail in, in ‘Anatomy of a bail in’ Journal of 
Financial Stability 15 (2014) 257.  The question of the impact of that bail in on those institutions holding 
equity and subordinated liabilities was not been considered.  
117 Avinash Persaud ‘Reinventing financial regulation: sanity is not statistical’ (2015) 3 Journal of 
International Banking and Finance Law 134 at 135. 
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wrong way around: banks set capital against relatively low risk 
activities in compliance with Basel II but failed to set capital against 
high risk activities because no one had asked them to.118  The new 
regulatory framework has shored up many gaps, but there are likely 
to be others where risks slip through. 
 
It is significant that ring-fencing has not been identified by the FSB 
as a “must have” item in its list of Key Attributes.  Banks need to 
meet the safety and soundness objectives set by regulators in order 
to protect consumers and the wider financial system, but it is also 
important to remember what banks are for; money tied up in 
regulatory initiatives is money that is taken out of the real economy 
and is unavailable for innovation and growth.  Banks are only patchily 
making funds available to those who need them, as has been 
identified in the EU’s green paper on Capital Markets Union, with 
many in need of credit finding that it is unavailable. 119  The focus of 
the Key Attributes and their implementation within the EU has been 
about protecting bank functions rather than the banks themselves.  
It remains to be seen whether the additional layer of regulation 
required for UK ring-fencing will make a sufficiently significant 
improvement to be worthwhile, even if it can help to make bank 
resolution processes more robust and increase the level of trust 
depositors have in the financial system. 
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